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Abstract 
Self-control has been studied extensively in both humans and nonhumans in 
relation to planning, goal-oriented behavior, and overall higher cognitive function. These 
investigations have resulted in a vast literature pool afflicted by differing definitions, 
procedural inconsistencies, and numerous paradigms that were thought to measure self-
control. I utilized a within subject design to address the question of what these existing 
tasks were actually studying and if they produced similar results. The present study tested 
squirrel monkeys on four tasks. Two of which were widely accepted self-control 
paradigms (food exchange and accumulation) that involved refraining from choosing a 
low-value reward in favor of a high-value reward. Importantly, these two rewards 
differed qualitatively (choosing a more preferred item) or quantitatively (choosing a 
larger amount of the same item) depending on the task/phase. The other two tasks were 
highly contested self-control paradigms (cylinder and A-not-B) that involved the 
inhibition of a prepotent motor response. All squirrel monkeys tested were capable of 
displaying self-control on all tasks, to some extent. However, the results indicate that not 
all self-control paradigms measure the same aspect of self-control, as individual 
performances varied across the tasks. Task type and previous experience with other self-
control tasks did not predict the variability in performance, but the qualitative or 
quantitative nature of the rewards did. Ultimately, this suggests that researchers should 
not compare the results from one task to that of another, especially if the nature of the 
reward differs. Finally, the present studies added to the existing literature pool of self-
control studies, specifically addressing the paucity of data for New World monkey 
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species in a way that allowed for the results to be directly compared to previous studies. 
Overall, the squirrel monkeys performed quite well on all tasks, indicating that they were 
promising subjects for future studies of self-control. 
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Introduction 
Animals, including humans, may benefit from restricting their behavior in certain 
social situations or from making decisions that will either increase their yield or prevent 
misfortune in the future. Self-control, and its supposed opposite, impulsivity, have been 
studied extensively in both humans and nonhumans in relation to planning and goal-
oriented behavior, substance abuse, and overall higher cognitive functions (Beran, 2018). 
Self-control has been investigated since the early 20th century, creating a vast literature 
pool afflicted by differing definitions and procedural inconsistencies (Eisenreich & 
Hayden, 2018). Historically, the behavioral definition of self-control was the act of 
choosing a higher valued, but more delayed reinforcer over a lower valued, less delayed 
reinforcer (Rachlin & Green, 1972). More recently, self-control has been viewed as an 
ability or skill that can be learned. Some researchers even suggest that it is a capacity that 
can be depleted with overuse or increased through training (e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & 
Tice, 2007), though this hypothesis has not been supported in nonhuman primate 
literature (De Petrillo et al., 2015; Parrish, Emerson, Rossettie, & Beran, 2016; Parrish et 
al., 2018). Decades of self-control studies have utilized multitudes of paradigms, each 
striving to uncover which species demonstrate this ability and to what extent. The 
research has led to an active debate about what these paradigms are actually testing and 
how their results should be interpreted (for an overview, see: Beran, 2015; Beran, 2018; 
Eisenreich & Hayden, 2018; Flessert & Beran, 2018). However, there is a lack of clear, 
experimental evidence to corroborate the arguments that comprise the debate. 
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Delay of gratification is a form of self-control that is typically broken down into 
two components (Beran, 2018) and is considered to be a prerequisite for complex goal-
directed action (Mischel, 1974). The first component, delay choice, is the initial decision 
to forgo an immediately available option in favor of a more valuable, but delayed option. 
The second component used to be known as “bridge the delay interval,” but has since 
come to be known as delay maintenance as it refers to the continued decision to 
“maintain” that initial choice when continually faced with the immediate option (Beran, 
2002). A popular example is one of going on a diet. If you decide one morning that you 
are going to start eating healthier, you are demonstrating delay choice. However, if later 
that night you are confronted with a delectable sweet treat, you could decide to stay true 
to your diet, thus exercising delay maintenance, or you could indulge yourself (and your 
impulsivity) and defect in regards to your choice to go on a diet. As demonstrated in this 
example, there is quite a difference between the two components, yet both are necessary 
to delay gratification long enough to reap the benefits of your self-control (increased 
health). 
The majority of self-control tests fall into one of three categories: delay choice, 
delay maintenance, and hybrid delay. In delay-choice tasks, participants are able to 
choose between two reward options, typically thought of as a “small reward sooner” or a 
“large reward later,” but rewards could differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Once 
the participant has made their choice, they cannot defect to the other option. For example, 
once a subject picks the more preferred but delayed option, they cannot change their 
mind and instead choose the less preferred, but immediate option. In this way, 
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participants can choose to delay their reward in order to procure a better one, but do not 
have to maintain their choice through the delay period. In delay-maintenance tasks, 
participants must maintain their self-control throughout a delay period if they are to 
receive the better reward. In other words, they are able to defect and choose the 
immediate reward at any point during the delay period, effectively terminating the trial. 
Hybrid tasks typically incorporate a delay-maintenance task into an existing delay-choice 
paradigm, so that the participant must first chose the more delayed option and then 
refrain from defecting to the small, immediate reward throughout the course of the trial. 
Controversy surrounds a possible forth category of self-control tests, behavioral 
inhibition tasks, which typically involve a transparent barrier that the participant must 
maneuver around in order to obtain a reward. Some researchers (MacLean et al., 2014) 
have used these tasks as a measure of self-control in experiments aimed at elucidating the 
evolutionary origins of self-control. Other researchers (namely Beran, 2015) have openly 
challenged behavioral inhibition tasks, asserting that they are not accurate measures of 
self-control, and at best, offer a measure of motor-inhibition, which is in some ways 
related, but not synonymous to, self-control. Below, I review some of these paradigms 
and what they might reveal about self-control abilities in nonhumans. 
Exchange tasks 
 Exchange tasks, at the foundational level, involve giving the subject an item of 
lower value (or an item associated with a lower value) that they can then exchange (either 
immediately or after a time delay) with an experimenter for a higher valued reward. The 
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item can be a small, inedible object as in token exchange tasks or a food reward as in 
delayed exchange tasks, which I will refer to as food exchange tasks for clarity.  
Token exchange tasks are sometimes referred to as bartering paradigms and are 
considered to be a delay-choice paradigm because once the token is chosen, they have 
forfeited the lower valued food. Token exchange has been used in a number of 
experiments to investigate a variety of topics (see Hackenberg, 2009,  for a review), 
however, Beran and Evans (2012) and Judge and Essler (2013) simultaneously, but 
independently integrated the use of tokens into similar tests of self-control. Beran and 
Evans (2012) ultimately gave three language-trained chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) a 
choice between an immediately available medium-value food and a lexigram token that 
they could exchange for its associated high-value food. Two of the three participants 
chose the high-value token significantly over chance, both when they could immediately 
exchange the token and when they had to wait two to three minutes to exchange. 
Judge and Essler (2013) conducted a similar experiment with brown capuchin 
monkeys (Sapajus apella) using small pieces of hardware as tokens. After a participant 
had demonstrated their knowledge of the token associations (by choosing to exchange all 
of the high-value tokens available before the low-value tokens), they were given a series 
of “bartering up” test sessions. First, participants were given the low-value token to 
exchange with an experimenter. After a successful exchange, the experimenter provided 
them with a choice between the immediately consumable, low-value reward that was 
associated with that token or a token that was associated with a high-value reward that 
they could then exchange for the more preferred reward. Two of the four participants 
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selected the high-value token over the low-value food significantly more than chance. 
These methods were then adapted for use in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciurieus; Russell, 
Early, Painter, & Judge, in prep). Four of five squirrel monkeys tested chose the high-
value token significantly more than chance. In all of the aforementioned studies, forgoing 
the immediately available lower valued food in favor of the high-value token was 
considered a demonstration of self-control, as it incorporates extra effort (an additional 
exchange is required) and an inherent time delay (as a result of the additional exchange). 
Food exchange tasks are presumably more difficult because they do not utilize 
tokens as a place-holder for the low-value food. Generally, the use of tokens, or other 
symbolic characters, in place of food rewards enhances performance (Addessi & Rossi, 
2011; Boysen, Mukobi, & Berntson, 1999; Mischel & Moore, 1973), however, this is not 
always the case (Evans, Beran, Paglieri, & Addessi, 2012). Participants are first given a 
piece of low-value food, and are required to hold it until they are given an opportunity to 
exchange it with the experimenter for a more desired reward. But at any time during the 
trial, they can forfeit the high-value reward by consuming the low-value reward in their 
possession. For this reason, it is considered a delay-maintenance task. In previous studies, 
the delay between receiving the low-value food and exchanging it has ranged from 
seconds to minutes depending on the species tested, the individual, and the size of the 
reward (e.g., brown capuchins, 10-80 s: Drapier, Chauvin, Dufour, Uhlrich, & Thierry, 
2005; Pelé, Micheletta, Uhlrich, Thierry, & Dufour, 2011; Ramseyer, Pelé, Dufour, 
Chauvin, & Thierry, 2006; long-tailed macaques, Macaca fascicularis, 10 s-21 min: Pelé, 
Dufour, Micheletta, & Thierry, 2010; tonkean macaques, Macaca tonkeana, 20 s-2 min 
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40 s: Pelé et al., 2011; chimpanzees, 15 s–8 min: Beran, Rossettie, & Parrish, 2016; 
Dufour, Pelé, Sterck, & Thierry, 2007; see Table 1). Many studies required the 
participants to return the initial food item unadulterated, while some studies allowed them 
to return a partially consumed reward (indicated in Table 1 by a superscript “b”). 
Returning the reward untouched likely required more self-control than being able to 
consume some of it in the delay period. Additionally, when partial consumption was 
tolerated, participants would be expected to optimize their reward amount by consuming 
as much of the initial, low-value item as allowed. Therefore, one should be careful when 
attempting comparisons across these studies, as any interspecific differences that were 
found should not be taken as a true representation of differing self-control abilities 
between species, as condoned nibbling could be a confounding factor. With this in mind, 
results generally show a greater capacity for delay maintenance in Old World species as 
compared to New World species (see Table 1). However, this is further confounded by a 
paucity of data for New World monkeys with capuchins being the only species studied 
(Drapier et al., 2005; Pelé et al., 2011; Ramseyer et al., 2006).  
Accumulation task 
This delay maintenance paradigm presents participants with a collection of food 
items that are transferred, one by one, within reach of the participant. The participant may 
take the food items at any time, however, when the participant does this, the experimenter 
stops transferring the food items, and the participants only receive the items that had 
accumulated within their reach during the trial. Thus, delay maintenance, and so, self-
control, is measured as the amount of time between when the first item becomes available 
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and when the participant decides to end the trial by taking a food item. The first 
nonhuman accumulation task procedure was modeled after studies of human children 
largely conducted by Toner and colleagues between 1977 and 1981 (Toner, 1981; Toner, 
Lewis, & Gribble, 1979; Toner & Smith, 1977) with one modification; all food that could 
be acquired during a trial were visible for the entirety of the trial (Beran, 2002). For this 
task to accurately measure delay maintenance, it is essential that the participant 
understands that food will continue to accumulate as the trial proceeds, as long as they do 
not interfere. For this reason, studies typically incorporate some kind of training phase or 
demonstration trials meant to teach the “rules of the game” to the participant, however, 
each study accomplishes this in a slightly different way. Demonstration trials are crucial 
because a failure to understand the premise of the test should not be interpreted as a 
failure to demonstrate delay maintenance. Apes, Old World monkeys, and New World 
monkeys have been tested on this task with various degrees of success: chimpanzees, up 
to 10 min (Beran, 2002; Beran & Evans, 2006; Beran & Evans, 2009; Evans & Beran, 
2007a; Evans et al., 2012; Parrish, Perdue, Evans, & Beran, 2013); bonobos (Pan 
paniscus), 50 s max delay interval (Stevens, Rosati, Heilbronner, & Mühlhoff, 2011); 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), 1 min 30 s max delay interval (Beran, 2002; Parrish et al., 
2014); rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), 30 s max delay interval (Evans & Beran, 
2007b); long-tailed macaques, Macaca fascicularis, 2 min 11 s (Pelé et al., 2010); 
tonkean macaques, Macaca tonkeana, 38 s-1 min 12 s (Pelé et al., 2011); brown 
capuchins, 2 s-1 min 30 s max delay interval (Pelé et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012; 
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Addessi et al., 2013; Beran, Perdue, et al., 2016; Anderson, Kuroshima, & Fujita, 2010); 
squirrel monkeys, 0-30 s, (Anderson et al., 2010; see Table 2). 
In the pioneering nonhuman primate study, Beran (2002) tested four chimpanzees 
and an orangutan in four differing conditions after an initial training phase. The basic 
procedure involved moving 20 chocolate pieces from one clear bowl out of the 
participant’s reach to another clear bowl within their reach. The training phase modeled 
the testing phases in all procedures but decreased the number of chocolate pieces that 
could be accumulated to 10 and continued until they could wait for all 10 pieces to be 
transferred (maximum required was four training sessions). The first three phases varied 
in the length of the delay and in the orientation of the experimenter to the participant. In 
phase one, the addition of each food piece was delayed by 3 s and the experimenter 
remained oriented toward the participant. In phase two, the delay was increased to 6 s and 
the experimenter had to turn and reach behind him to pick up the next piece of food to be 
transferred. In this way, the experimenter effectively had his back turned to the subject 
for approximately 3 s of the 6 s delay. For the third phase, the delay was increased to 9 s 
and the experimenter had to walk away from the participant to collect the next food piece 
to be transferred, again effectively turning his back to the participant, but this time for a 
longer duration. The forth phase investigated the effect of food preference on delay 
maintenance and varied the type of food that accumulated across (not within) trials. The 
results indicated that the orientation of the experimenter did not influence the apes’ 
ability to demonstrate delay maintenance, nor did differing food preferences. However, 
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any food preference effect could have been obscured by a ceiling effect, since all 
participants were already close to perfect performance across all test phases. 
Evans and Beran (2007b) tested rhesus macaques on a similar task where up to 
ten grapes could accumulate in their food pan, with a transfer occurring once every 3 s, 
creating a maximum possible delay of 30 s. There was no mention of training trials for 
this study, so it seems as though they were able to spontaneously infer that all the food 
would be transferred, and learned that if they interfered, the accumulation stopped. In a 
later phase of the study, they found that having a single grape follow nine pieces of low-
value food increased the participants’ delay tolerance. Though there were marked 
individual differences, five of the nine participants were able to tolerate the entirety of the 
delay on several occasions. 
Anderson, Kuroshima, & Fujita (2010) modified Evans and Beran (2007) 
procedure for squirrel monkeys and brown capuchins, however, procedures varied 
slightly between species. Participants had at least two demonstration trials throughout 
each testing session, one for the very first trial, and at least one more during the session 
(capuchins received four, while squirrel monkeys received two). Within blocks of three 
trials, the duration of the delay between transfer was randomly determined, so that one 
trial would consist of 1 s delays, another would have 3 s delays, and yet another would 
have 5 s delays. I believe the randomization of the differing delay lengths was to prohibit 
the monkeys from developing an expectation of how much time would pass before the 
next delivery. Evans and Beran (2007) also addressed this concern, but in a different 
manner. If the participants were not successful in obtaining more than one piece of food 
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across several trials, they moved on to phases that were thought to encourage 
performance in a stepwise fashion. The first of which presented the participant with a 
“free” piece of food before the start of the trial. The second included this free piece of 
food and presented food of increasing sizes, similar to how Evans and Beran (2007) 
increased the value of the last food item for macaques. One of the four squirrel monkeys 
demonstrated self-control during the first phase that only included demonstration trials. 
Another squirrel monkey and two of the four capuchins also did so after the food items 
increased in size.  
Behavioral Inhibition 
Given their procedural ease and potential for adaptability to a wide range of 
species with differing perceptual and motor modalities, behavioral inhibition paradigms 
are a frequent choice for researchers. Typically, this suite of tasks (including, but not 
limited to, A-not-B, middle cup, cylinder, swinging door, Plexiglas hole) involve a 
transparent barrier that the participant must simply reach their hand around or maneuver 
their body around to retrieve a reward. However, these tasks are contentious within the 
field. Some researchers use them interchangeably with other self-control tasks, 
interpreting the results as being representative of the individual’s or species’ overall self-
control ability (MacLean et al., 2014). However, others (Beran, 2015) have disagreed 
with this approach, arguing that behavioral inhibition should not be treated as if it is 
synonymous with self-control. Both support their opinions with their definition of self-
control. Beran (2015) defines self-control as a choice between two options differing in 
value and/or cost, whereas MacLean et al. (2014) defines self-control as, “the ability to 
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inhibit a prepotent but ultimately counterproductive behavior.” Thus, it seems that the 
nature of the debate may extend beyond the appropriateness of the tasks into the essence 
of what self-control is (or is not). While there may never be a unanimous consensus as to 
how self-control should be defined, differences between types of tasks and what they 
measure can be further investigated. 
The A-not-B task examines whether participants can inhibit searching for food in 
a location where they have found food before when the food is moved to a new location. 
The participant is first presented with a few familiarization trials, where they watch the 
experimenter place a reward under the left (or right) most cup of a linear, three cup 
arrangement. They are then allowed to retrieve the reward. After completing the 
familiarization trials, the subject receives a single test session in which they watch the 
experimenter bait the same cup that was baited in the previous trials, however, before the 
participant has a chance to retrieve the reward, the experimenter conspicuously moves the 
reward to the other outer-most cup. A correct response is searching for the reward in the 
new location, thereby demonstrating “self-control” through inhibiting an impulsive, 
prepotent motor response to search in the old location. 
Amici, Aureli, and Call (2008) conducted a battery of tests meant to measure 
aspects of behavioral inhibition on a wide selection of primates and correlated 
performance with the differing dietary preferences, social structures, and phylogenies of 
the difference species. One of their five tasks was the A-not-B task, which they had 
adapted from Piaget's (1954) experiment with human children. Another was a delay-
choice task (intertemporal choice). Performance across the tasks was most closely 
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correlated with social structure, with fission-fusion species demonstrating the highest 
levels of behavioral inhibition. While the authors never explicitly mention the term “self-
control” in the article, they did utilize a traditional self-control task alongside a more 
controversial one. Additionally, they looked at behavioral inhibition as a measure of 
adaptive behavioral flexibility, concluding that individuals in fission-fusion societies 
perform better because they must flexibly demonstrate/inhibit certain behaviors to 
successfully navigate their ever-changing social surroundings. They go on to say that 
their results support the social brain hypothesis, which states that species with more 
complex social lives have evolved more advanced cognitive abilities (Dunbar, 1998). 
One of the leading theories as to why self-control evolved, closely resembles this 
interpretation, stating that self-control is one component of the advanced cognitive 
abilities developed. In fact, as I will discuss shortly, this is the main argument of 
MacLean et al. (2014).  
The cylinder task is similar to the A-not-B task, beginning with a series of 
familiarization trials where participants watch an experimenter bait a horizontally 
positioned opaque tube-shaped round cylinder with a food reward and are then allowed to 
retrieve the reward. These trials function to teach the participant the proper retrieval 
technique that involves reaching around the front of the cylinder to the side opening. The 
test trials are procedurally the same, except that the opaque cylinder is replaced with a 
transparent one. If the subject reaches directly for the reward, instead of maneuvering 
around the cylinder as they did in the familiarization trials, it is scored as an incorrect 
response. The cylinder task and similar tasks have been termed detour paradigms because 
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a detour must be taken around the side of the cylinder to obtain the food. Because the 
participants have presumably learned the correct response through the familiarization 
trials, incorrect responses are thought to arise from an impulse to reach directly for the 
reward. Impulsivity is often thought of as the opposite of self-control, and so interpreting 
this behavioral inhibition as impulsivity, presumably quantifies the lack of self-control in 
participants. 
MacLean et al. (2014) explicitly state that they used the A-not-B and cylinder 
tasks to measure self-control as a proxy for overall cognitive function, with the ultimate 
aim of investigating hypotheses regarding the proximate and ultimate causes of the 
evolution of higher cognitive processes. The results suggest that the proximate cause of 
self-control is absolute brain volume, whereas the ultimate cause is a variable diet. Not 
surprisingly, apes were reported to have the highest composite score from both tasks. 
However, the relative ranks of the other species are intriguing, with apes being followed 
by domestic dogs, then Old World monkeys, lemurs, rodents, birds, and lastly squirrel 
monkeys. While these tasks can be considered measures of self-control under the broader 
definition of self-control as the ability to inhibit ultimately counterproductive behavior, 
Beran (2015) argues that self-control tasks must consist of three factors in order to for 
them to actually be testing self-control. These factors are: 1) at least two known choices 
for participants to choose from, 2) both choices must be valuable, but differentially 
preferred by the subject, 3) there must be some cost associated with the more preferred 
reward. Considering these criteria, neither of the tasks utilized by MacLean et al. (2014) 
would be considered valid tests of self-control. They may meet the first criterion, in that 
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the A-not-B task has three different cups to choose from and it could be argued that the 
cylinder task incorporates choices of “reach toward” and “reach around.” However, both 
tasks fail to meet the second criterion because not all of their choices are valuable, 
because essentially an incorrect response results in no reward. The third criterion is 
debatable, the A-not-B might not have known options if they are unaware that rewards 
can be retrieved from cups other than the one used in familiarization trials or if they do 
not understand the causality of moving the reward. For the cylinder task, previous studies 
have explicitly stated that the familiarization trials serve to “teach” them the correct 
response of detouring around the barrier, however, countless familiarization trials would 
not teach them to reach around a transparent barrier if they do not fully grasp the concept 
of transparency. Therefore, they would not know that they have two choices from which 
to choose. 
In addition to Beran’s criticisms, a recent study that tested several corvid species 
on the cylinder task contended that if they had been included in MacLean’s study, the 
correlations between absolute brain size and self-control would have been nonexistent, as 
the corvids’ performance on the task rivaled that of great apes despite their smaller brains 
(Kabadayi, Taylor, von Bayern, & Osvath, 2016). Several studies have since corroborated 
Kabadayi et al.’s (2016) argument and are thoroughly reviewed by Kabadayi, Bobrowicz, 
and Osvath (2018) with the general conclusion that specific brain regions or neuronal 
density/populations are responsible for the expression of behavioral inhibition, not 
absolute brain size. More importantly, Kabadayi et al. (2018) also review important 
procedural considerations of the detour paradigm. They support the use of detour tasks, 
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because they are easy to administer and “ecologically relevant,” with animals often 
needing to detour around things in their natural environment to achieve a desired goal. 
However, they discuss how many noncognitive factors such as reward visibility, distance 
from the reward, rearing in an enriched environment, prior exposure to transparent 
objects, motivation, and age can influence an individual’s performance on detour tasks. 
Furthermore, they provide evidence that seems to suggest performance inconsistencies on 
different detour tasks are due to the orientation of the barrier. They briefly mention the 
inherent issue of transparent objects, stating that participants should have sufficient 
experience with them prior to testing, however, this topic is better addressed by van 
Horik et al. (2018). Expanding upon Kabadayi et al. (2018), van Horik et al. (2018) 
provided evidence that two inhibitory control tasks (cylinder and barrier) were indeed 
highly influenced by noncognitive factors such as motivation to retrieve the reward and 
previous experience with transparent objects. However, they go further than Kabadayi et 
al. (2018), suggesting that the cylinder task may not be an accurate measure of behavioral 
inhibition, let alone self-control, coining the term “putative inhibitory control tests” to 
refer to tasks that involve transparent barriers. They suggest that any behavioral 
inhibition task that utilizes transparent barriers is confounded by the fact that animals 
would not naturally come into contact with transparent objects in the wild, therefore, 
there is no reason to expect that they would innately understand their properties. For this 
reason, any tests that utilize transparent objects could be considered invalid, especially 
since van Horik et al.’s (2018) results are not the only ones to suggest that exposure to 
transparent objects (like glass windows used in captive environments) could give certain 
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individuals advantages over others (Bojczyk & Corbetta, 2004; Kabadyi et al., 2016). As 
suggested by Kabadayi et al. (2018), one way to circumvent this issue, is to give 
participants ample opportunities to learn the rules of transparent objects before testing 
begins, however, this has rarely been addressed in experimental designs (e.g., MacLean 
et al., 2014). 
Behavioral inhibition tasks can be advantageous because of their adaptability to a 
wide variety of species and ease of administration, however, it seems as though one must 
be extremely wary of noncognitive factors that could affect a participant’s performance. 
The legitimacy of behavioral inhibition tasks as a measure of self-control is still 
debatable, and arguably, dependent on how self-control is defined in the context of the 
experiment. Given the claims that behavioral inhibition and other self-control tasks 
measure equivocal processes, an investigation into the topic is warranted. To the best of 
my knowledge, no experiments have explicitly addressed this question. Therefore, there 
is a need for a within-subject design testing individuals on both behavioral inhibition 
tasks and other, more accepted self-control paradigms, in order to compare performance 
across tasks.  
 
Aims and Predictions 
Except for brown capuchin monkeys, there is a paucity of data regarding the self-
control abilities of New World monkeys, and the few studies that do address the topic are 
difficult to compare with existing paradigms used on Old World monkeys or utilized an 
experimental paradigm (i.e., intertemporal choice) not included in this review due to its 
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vastly problematic nature (for overview, see Hayden, 2016). Despite a general opinion 
that squirrel monkeys have relatively short attention spans and are highly distractible 
(Fragaszy, 1985), some previous experiments indicate that they are viable subjects for 
tests of self-control abilities (Anderson, Awazu, & Fujita, 2000; Anderson, Awazu, & 
Fujita, 2004; Anderson et al., 2010; Russell et al., in prep). I tested squirrel monkeys on 
an array of existing self-control paradigms. These experiments were the first to examine 
the performance of squirrel monkeys in an exchange task that did not involve the use of 
tokens. Squirrel monkeys have been previously tested on the other proposed tasks: delay-
maintenance (Anderson et al., 2010), A-not-B (MacLean et al., 2014), and cylinder 
(MacLean et al., 2014). However, I believed there was sufficient reason to warrant 
replications of the tasks with refined methodologies. Additionally, replication of the tasks 
allowed for a within-subject design that was used to address the efficacy of the 
paradigms, and what they might be telling us about self-control and impulsivity.  
The delay-maintenance paradigm conducted by Anderson et al. (2010) was 
designed to explicitly help the participants perform well on the accumulation task. 
Therefore, the squirrel monkeys were given many affordances that other species did not 
receive and it was interesting to determine if they were able to learn the task with less 
prompting. Additionally, the experiment was ended without providing the squirrel 
monkeys with a task that could be compared to previously tested species. My 
methodology excluded these training biases in addition to replicating phase one of 
experiment one from Evans and Beran (2007) to allow for direct comparison across 
species. The present studies combined aspects of several experiments (Anderson et al., 
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2010; Beran, 2002; Beran, Perdue, et al., 2016; Evans & Beran, 2007b) to produce a test 
suitable for squirrel monkeys but more comparable to a broader range of previously 
completed accumulation studies.  
In both the A-not-B and cylinder tasks, squirrel monkeys performed quite poorly 
when compared with other nonhuman primate species (MacLean et al., 2014). As 
previously discussed, the field would benefit from experimental evidence explicitly 
addressing behavioral inhibition tasks in relation to other tests of self-control. Testing 
squirrel monkeys that have already been tested in a self-control task with varying degrees 
of success (Russell et al., in prep) allowed me to compare their performance on a more 
widely accepted self-control paradigm to that of the more contentious behavioral 
inhibition tasks. If their performance replicated that of the squirrel monkeys in MacLean 
et al. (2014) it would be the first experiment to directly show the same set of subjects 
excelling on one self-control task (token exchange/bartering) and performing poorly on 
the controversial self-control tasks (A-not-B and cylinder). Results would be the first 
evidence to strongly corroborate Beran’s (2015) assertion that these two tasks are not 
accurate tests of self-control abilities.  
Importantly, this was one of the few self-control experiments that incorporated a 
within-subject design (Addessi et al., 2013; Beran, Perdue, et al., 2016; Parrish et al., 
2018; Pelé et al., 2010; Pelé et al., 2011) and the only study that attempted to control for 
experience effects through counterbalancing tasks within each category. Eisenreich and 
Hayden (2018) mention that a human delay maintenance task (the marshmallow test) and 
a delay choice task (intertemporal choice) differentially predict success measures later in 
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life, while Addessi et al. (2013) raised the question of whether delay choice and delay 
maintenance were comparable tests. As stated earlier, it is thought that delay of 
gratification is a multifaceted form of self-control, consisting of an initial choice and then 
fidelity to that choice. They compared the performance of brown capuchins across the 
two subsets of delay of gratification tasks, delay choice (intertemporal choice) and delay 
maintenance (accumulation), and found only weak evidence for the tasks being 
equivalent. Their results partially support the hypothesis that delay choice and delay 
maintenance are separate components of delay of gratification. Pelé et al. (2011) tested 
tonkean macaques and brown capuchin monkeys on two different delay maintenance 
paradigms (food exchange and accumulation), focusing their discussion upon the 
interspecies comparison rather than performance across tasks within a species. While it 
was not their focus, their results do show that capuchins were able to wait 2 to 4 times 
longer in the accumulation task than in the exchange task. However, they did not find 
similar results for the macaques who waited just as long over both tasks. These results 
seem to suggest that exchange tasks are more difficult for capuchins, and perhaps other 
New World monkeys, than accumulation tasks, and thus, the tasks themselves may not be 
comparable, even though they both address delay maintenance. Therefore, it is possible 
that these two delay maintenance tasks (food exchange and accumulation) may be not be 
testing the same aspects of self-control, and further investigation with another New 
World monkey species could elucidate any differences between these tasks and species 
performance across them. The experiments conducted explicitly investigated how squirrel 
monkeys perform across these two delay-maintenance tasks to assess whether they were 
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comparable as well as comparing them to a different set of self-control tasks (behavioral 
inhibition). Beran, Perdue, et al. (2016) found that training capuchins on one self-control 
task did not improve performance on another self-control task, however, experience 
within a specific task did improve performance on that task. While the sample size for 
these studies was too small to explicitly test for experience effects, counterbalancing the 
tasks within type (A-not-B with cylinder and food exchange with accumulation) 
controlled for the possibility that experience within a particular set of tasks allowed 
subjects to perform better on subsequent tasks of a similar type.  
The proposed battery of self-control tasks not only investigated the extent of self-
control abilities in squirrel monkeys, but also allowed for the comparison of the 
paradigms themselves. Addessi et al. (2013) highlights the importance of an investigation 
of this nature stating that, “a better understanding of what each task exactly measures is 
necessary to foster our knowledge of origins and mechanisms of delay of gratification.” 
Two recent reviews on the topic have echoed this sentiment, calling into question various 
measures of self-control that are often taken to be equivalent (Flessert & Beran, 2018) 
and bringing attention to the “dearth of validated self-control measures” along with the 
need to study a wider variety of species (Eisenreich & Hayden, 2018). 
In the present studies, the accumulation and food exchange tasks differed between 
the low- and high-value choices with one mostly incorporating a difference in quantity 
(accumulation), and the other dealing with a difference in quality (food exchange task), 
however, one of the four phases of the accumulation task did include a quality distinction 
as well. While differences in performance across the two tasks used in the present studies 
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(accumulation and food exchange) could not directly be compared in relation to this 
quality-quantity distinction, it could lend itself to further investigation on what factors 
may have affected a participant’s motivation to exhibit self-control. Some studies suggest 
that participants will demonstrate more self-control when rewards differ in quality 
compared to when they differ quantity (capuchins: Beran, Perdue, et al., 2016; Ramseyer 
et al., 2006; corvids: Hillemann, Bugnyar, Kotrschal, & Wascher, 2014), suggesting that 
accumulation may be inherently more difficult than food exchange. The present study 
allowed for further investigation of this through comparing performance within the 
accumulation task. 
 
Methods 
Subjects and Housing 
Six female squirrel monkeys ranging in age from 10 to 25 years participated in the 
present studies. The squirrel monkeys were socially housed at the Bucknell University 
Animal Behavior Laboratory in a single group with one other female squirrel monkey 
who was not be tested due to poor eye sight. A majority of the participants had previous 
experience using a touchscreen and choosing between baited objects (i.e., cups and tools: 
Judge, Tomeo, Zander, Powell & Miller, 2015; Marsh, Vining, Levendoski, & Judge, 
2015; Painter, Russell, & Judge, in press; Zander, Weiss, & Judge, 2013). It should be 
noted that transparent cups were used by Zander et al. (2013) and that the monkeys had 
seen transparent objects before (windows, plastic containers, Plexiglas dividers attached 
to caging). Five of the six had prior experience with a token exchange paradigm designed 
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to test self-control, in which four successfully demonstrated self-control (Russell et al., in 
prep).  
The captive-bred monkeys were housed in an indoor/outdoor enclosure consisting 
of an approximately 2.3 x 5.8 x 5.3 (h x w x l) m indoor quarter and an outdoor corncrib 
measuring 12 m high and 5 m in diameter. The indoor quarter was constructed of plastic 
paneling and stainless steel welded-wire caging and was subdivided into three 
approximately equal sized compartments separated by interconnecting doorways. The 
front of each compartment was constructed of 1 x 2” h x w (2.5 x 5.1 cm) caging wire, 
which provided an experimenter access to the monkeys for testing. The enclosure 
contained structures such as swings, shelves, and perches to promote naturalistic 
locomotion. Enrichment items were continually present. Animals were fed twice daily at 
approximately 0730 and 1600 hr on a diet of high protein monkey biscuits, fruits, nuts, 
grains, cereals and vegetables, and water was available ad libitum. The research was 
approved by and complied with Bucknell University IACUC guidelines. The subjects 
were maintained in accordance to USDA guidelines and husbandry plans were annually 
submitted to and approved by Bucknell University IACUC. 
General Procedures 
Testing occurred seven hours after the initial feeding, immediately before the 
second to control for hunger state which could affect motivation to retrieve the reward. 
Subjects were separated from their conspecifics in a side compartment of the home 
enclosure for testing, as in previous experiments. As mentioned, the A-not-B and cylinder 
tasks were counterbalanced across the subjects to control for possible effects of 
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experience. Delay maintenance and food exchange tasks were also counterbalanced for 
the same reason. All six subjects were used in the A-not-B, cylinder, and delay-
maintenance tasks. The food exchange task was restricted to five subjects because one 
monkey did not learn to exchange items with the experimenter and was not used in the 
previously conducted token exchange task. Subjects only received one test session per 
day, regardless of the task.  
 
Experiments 
A-not-B 
I replicated Amici et al.'s (2008) procedure, which was a slight modification of 
Piaget's (1954) experiment with human children, and was used in MacLean et al. (2014) 
as a test of self-control. The task consisted of a series of familiarization trials 
immediately followed by ten test trials. For the familiarization trials, three cups, each 
3.81 x 4.45 x 5.72 (h x w x l) cm were placed on their side on a platform, 3.81 x 8.89 x 
40.64 (h x w x l) cm (Figure 1). A reward (mealworm) was placed in front of one of the 
outermost cups and then each cup was flipped up sequentially, starting with the baited 
cup, to cover the reward. The same outermost cup was used across all familiarization 
trials within subjects, but left and right sides were randomly counterbalanced between 
subjects. The platform was then pushed forward so the subject could select a single cup. 
Subjects were required to successfully complete three consecutive trials, by accurately 
selecting the cup containing the reward, before moving on to the test trials. After the 
familiarization criterion was met, the subject was given ten test trials immediately 
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afterwards, as a part of the same session. These test trials began exactly like the 
familiarization trials, but before the platform was pushed forward, the reward was 
conspicuously moved from the familiar outermost cup to the opposite outermost cup (see 
Video 1, note the entire platform was painted blue for experimental trials as in Figure 1). 
The subject’s selection was recorded as a success (newly baited cup) or a failure (familiar 
or middle cup).  
Cylinder Task 
Many variations of this task have been conducted, however, I replicated MacLean 
et al.’s (2014) procedure to allow for direct comparison with their results. Subjects were 
given a series of familiarization trials until a criterion of 4 out of 5 correct responses on 
consecutive trials was met. For these trials, I visibly baited a horizontal, opaque PVC 
cylinder that was painted blue (3in long x 1.5in inside diameter) with a mealworm 
(Figure 2A). The subjects were then given a chance to obtain the reward. A correct 
response was recorded as a reach to one of the open sides of the cylinder (Figure 3A). 
Any attempt that involved a reach to the top or front side of the cylinder was recorded as 
incorrect (Figure 3B). Regardless of the subject’s initial response, they were allowed to 
retrieve the reward. Immediately after criterion was met, ten test trials were performed 
similarly, except that the opaque cylinder was replaced with a transparent, but otherwise 
identical PVC cylinder (Figure 2B). 
Food Exchange Task 
The procedure for this task was based on that of Drapier et al. (2005) and 
Ramseyer et al. (2006), but was not a complete replication of either. Both studies 
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incorporated the same two familiarization sessions. I replicated the first as a training 
phase in which the monkeys were given a token and subjected to a five second delay 
before they could exchange that token for a food reward until they reached a criterion of 
successfully exchanging in at least nine trials of the 10-trial session. As the participants 
were already proficient exchangers, this served as a reacclimation phase, as it was 
approximately two months since they had engaged in any exchange behavior by the start 
of data collection. 
The second familiarization session from Drapier et al. (2005) and Ramseyer et al. 
(2006) was utilized as my first testing phase, in order to determine if squirrel monkeys 
would spontaneously exchange food for food with experimenters, whereas most other 
experiments have incorporated at least one training session to train participants to 
exchange one extremely low-valued food item for a more desirable one (Drapier et al., 
2005; Dufour et al., 2007; Pelé et al., 2010; Pelé et al., 2011; Ramseyer et al., 2006). 
Low- and high-value rewards for each subject were determined and utilized in a previous 
experiment (see Table 3 for a summary, Russell et al., in prep). Prior to testing for the 
current studies, these low- and high-value pairs were verified for all participants, with all 
still preferring their high-value food significantly more than their low-value food. 
Monkeys needed to choose the high-value food at least 17 out of 20 trials over two 10-
trial sessions to verify their preference (according to a binomial distribution, p < .01). On 
a separate day of testing, it was verified that all participants would still consume 10 
pieces of their low-value food when presented alone. Reward values differed qualitatively 
because evidence from two populations of capuchins as well as corvids suggest that 
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qualitative reward differences are more likely to promote and sustain delay of 
gratification than quantitative differences (Beran, Perdue, et al., 2016; Hillemann et al., 
2014; Ramseyer et al., 2006). 
Subjects were shown the low-value food in one hand and the high-value food in 
the other hand for 3 s, with the food placements semi-randomly counterbalanced between 
hands across trials, so that the same arrangement did not occur more than twice in a row. 
Then I gave the monkey the low-value food and immediately held out a cupped hand 
against the caging, while continuing to show the monkey the high-value food. If the 
monkey placed the low-value food in my cupped hand, they were given the high-value 
food. Monkeys were required to return the low-value reward intact, although both studies 
cited above allowed subjects to consume part of the reward in some experimental phases. 
Subjects received a minimum of two 10-trial sessions but continued until they met a 
criterion of 90% successful exchanges over their last two sessions (a criterion similar to 
that of Ramseyer et al., 2006). Monkeys who reached criterion moved on to the second 
phase of testing which incorporated time delays before an exchange could be made. The 
minimum of two 10-trial sessions allows for the comparison of performance between this 
task and the previous bartering task the participants completed (Russell et al., in prep). 
Phase two replicated the first experimental phase of Ramseyer et al. (2006) 
conducted on brown capuchin monkeys. Participants received 12-trial sessions in which 
six trials had no delay (exactly like phase one) and six trials of specified increasing time 
delays (2, 5, 10, 20 s). Delays were measured here, and in subsequent tasks, by counting 
out the seconds, which was verified with a digital wrist watch. Trial types were semi-
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randomized, so that no more than two trials of the same type (delay vs no delay) were 
presented sequentially. The purpose of the six no-delay trials was to keep the participants 
interested in the experiments and facilitate their continued persistence (Ramseyer et al., 
2006). During the delay, the high-value food remained visible, however, I did not present 
a cupped hand for exchange until the specified delay had passed. If the low-value reward 
was consumed or dropped the trial ended and the time of the failure was recorded. If a 
participant successfully exchanged in 5 out of 6 delay trials they moved onto the next, 
longer time delay. A maximum of three 12-trial sessions for each time delay was set. If 
participants failed to reach the 5/6 criterion in three sessions but exchanged in at least 3 
out of 18 total delay trials (16% of trials), they also moved onto the next, longer time 
delay. Participants that failed to exchange at least 3 times within each specified time 
delay were not tested further. These criteria were chosen because they were used in 
Ramseyer et al. (2006). The percentage of successful exchanges was used for analysis, as 
subjects received a different number of trials/sessions. 
Participants who successfully exchanged the low-value food for the high-value 
food at or above criterion in delay trials were given two, twelve-trial control sessions. 
Following the same procedure described above, they were given the high-value food and 
then offered an opportunity to exchange it for the low-valued food. This controlled for 
the possibility that the participants learned an associative rule such as “always exchange 
with the experimenter.” 
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Accumulation Task 
Anderson et al. (2010) tested squirrel monkeys on an accumulation task, however, 
their procedure was created to enhance the monkey’s performance, and deviated from 
existing accumulation task procedures (e.g. Beran, 2002; Evans & Beran, 2007b). My 
procedure combined aspects of four experiments to remove the majority of the 
affordances given to the squirrel monkeys that were tested by Anderson et al. (2010) and 
to allow for comparison to previously tested species. 
The apparatus mimicked that of Anderson et al. (2010) and consisted of a rolling 
tray 42.54 x 57.15 (w x l) cm with two white rectangles, each 4.45 x 22.86 (w x l) cm that 
were parallel to each other, 17.34 cm apart, but perpendicular to the subject. One 
rectangle was out-of-reach for the participant and acted as the “store zone” that held all 
the rewards that could be obtained during a single trial (Figure 4). The rectangle within 
reach, located 4.61 cm from the front edge of the rolling tray, acted as the “drop zone” to 
which the rewards from the store zone were transferred. All other food items for 
subsequent trials were hidden from the participant’s view.  
Phase one consisted of a maximum of four 4-trial sessions, because this total of 
16 trials was comparable to the 15 trials administered to the rhesus macaques by Evans 
and Beran (2007b). To prepare a trial, 6 pieces of the participant’s high-value food (the 
same used in the food exchange experiment) were placed in the store zone and then the 
tray was rolled up to the caging. The trial began when the first piece of high-value food 
was placed into the drop zone. The subsequent food pieces were transferred into the drop 
zone one at a time, as quickly as possible, so that there was approximately a 1 s delay 
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between pieces. A trial ended when the monkey took a piece of food from the drop zone. 
At that time, they were allowed to collect all the food that had accumulated in the drop 
zone while the remaining food in the store zone was removed from view. The empty cart 
was then rolled away from the caging to begin a 30 s inter-trial interval. This phase was 
intended to reveal whether or not squirrel monkeys could spontaneously perform on this 
task similarly to other species tested (Beran, 2002; Evans & Beran, 2007b). All monkeys 
then moved on to phase two to account for Beran, Perdue, et al. (2016) incorporating 
demonstration trials at the start of each testing session, allowing the results of the present 
study to be compared to those of the aforementioned study.  
Phase two was procedurally similar to phase one except for the inclusion of 
demonstration trials and a variation in delay length. This was a direct replication of phase 
one of Anderson et al. (2010) and consisted of ten 8-trial sessions. Trials 1 and 5 were 
demonstration trials, where the rolling cart was pulled away from the caging while the 
trial proceeded. All of the food pieces were moved from the store zone to the drop zone 
with a 3 s delay between transfers before the cart was pushed forward to the caging, 
allowing the monkeys to retrieve the rewards. Pulling the cart away from the caging 
prevented them from ending the trial early because they could not reach the drop zone, 
effectively demonstrating that all food pieces would eventually be moved within their 
reach. As previously described, trials 2-4 and 6-8 had one each of 1, 3, and 5s delays 
randomly ordered, to prevent the participants from forming expectations. After 
completing 10 sessions, all monkeys moved on to phase three.  
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Phase three was procedurally the same as phase two above, with the inclusion of 
the demonstration trials, except that the last piece of food in the sequence was valued 
higher that the preceding five pieces. More specifically, the first five pieces of food were 
low-value and the sixth piece of food was of high-value, utilizing the low- and high-
valued food for each participant from the food exchange task. Results from Evans and 
Beran (2007b) suggested that the qualitative discrepancy in reward values would 
motivate them to allow the trial to finish before reaching for food. Criterion for this phase 
was accumulating all food pieces available for accumulation in three consecutive 
sessions. Monkeys that performed at criterion on this phase moved on to phase four, 
which was identical to phase two of testing, to determine if they could continue to delay 
gratification when all of the rewards were highly valued. The “free” pieces of food that 
were given to the participants at the start of each trial in phase two of Anderson et al. 
(2010) were not incorporated into this study because it was not shown to effect 
performance.  
The fifth and final testing phase increased the number of items that could be 
accumulated during a trial to 10, with a 3 s delay between transfers. Therefore, this final 
testing phase was a direct replication of Evans and Beran’s (2007b) experiment with 
rhesus macaques, and allowed for comparison between most of the species previously 
tested. 
The number of food items obtained were recorded. Participants were compared as 
to how many pieces of food they were able to accumulate as a percentage of the total 
food pieces they could have accumulated. The percentage was used because participants 
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received a different number of trials. However, the first piece of food for each trial was 
not included in analysis since this piece signified the start of a trial and all subjects 
would, by default, accumulate at least that one piece.  
Data Analyses. Chi-Square tests were used to compare the frequency of 
successful monkeys on the cylinder and A-not-B tasks to those of MacLean et al. (2014). 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests were used to compare performance across phases in both the 
accumulation task and the food exchange task. Performance across tasks was compared 
by visually inspecting the ranks each animal received for each task. Ranks were assigned 
based on number of correct responses (A-not-B, cylinder), how quickly they met criterion 
(token exchange, food exchange – no delay phase), and the percentage of food pieces 
exchanged (food exchange – overall) or accumulated (accumulation).  
 
 
Results - Behavioral Inhibition Paradigms 
A-not-B and Cylinder Tasks. Ten test trials were administered, however, for the 
comparisons made to previous studies that only conducted one test trial (Amici et al., 
2008; MacLean et al., 2014) only the first test trial was considered. Individual and 
species performance in the first test trial was summarized for all subjects in Table 4, 
along with a comparison to the squirrel monkeys’ performance from MacLean et al. 
(2014). Analyses were conducted identically to MacLean et al. (2014). Performance was 
recorded as correct (C) or incorrect (I), with correct receiving a score of 100 and incorrect 
receiving 0. Composite scores were calculated by taking the average of the A-not-B and 
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cylinder scores for each individual. Individual scores were averaged to provide a group 
score for each task. All participants chose correctly on their first A-not-B test trial 
resulting in an average group score of 100 (N = 6), which is sharply contrasted by the 
average species score from the 19 squirrel monkeys in MacLean et al. (2014) at a low of 
15.8. A 2 x 2 Chi Square test examining the relationship between population (Bucknell vs 
MacLean) and number of successful monkeys (Yes or No) was statistically significant, 
X2(1, N = 25) = 14.04, p < .001, indicating Bucknell monkeys were successful more than 
expected and MacLean moneys were successful less than expected. Four individuals 
chose correctly on their first cylinder test trial, for an average group score of 66.66, which 
was noticeably higher than the 33.37 species average score from MacLean et al. (2014), 
however, a 2 x 2 Chi Square test was not significant, X2(1, N = 25) = 1.65, p = .21, 
indicating no population differences. One of the two individuals (Debi) that was 
unsuccessful on her first trial took considerably longer to meet the criterion to pass the 
familiarization trials than the rest of the participants. The composite score for the present 
study was 83.33 and differed markedly from the 24.7 from MacLean et al. (2014). The 
composite results also indicated population level differences, 2 x 2 Chi Square test X2(1, 
N = 25) = 6.18, p < .03.  
Individual and species performance for all ten test trials was summarized for all 
subjects in Table 5. Individual scores were calculated by averaging the scores they 
received for each trial of each particular task. Each individual score then contributed to 
the “average species score” reported. The comparison to MacLean et al. (2014) could not 
be made here due to the differing number of test trials. One difference was that two 
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individuals chose incorrectly on their second and sixth trials in the cylinder task, 
depressing the average cylinder group score to 96.67. Another notable point was that one 
individual continued to perform poorly throughout the cylinder testing session, only 
making a correct response on the second and tenth trials. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
individual was the one who took much longer to meet the familiarization criterion than all 
others (Debi). Despite her performance the average group score of 85 was still higher 
when considering all test trials compared to 66.66 (first trials only), and the group 
composite score of 90.83 was higher still. 
 
Discussion - Behavioral Inhibition Paradigms 
A-not-B and Cylinder Task. Based on MacLean et al.’s (2014) results, I 
predicted that squirrel monkeys would not perform well on both the A-not-B and cylinder 
tasks, despite their successful performance on the bartering paradigm (Russell et al., in 
prep). If this was the case, it would have been the first experimental evidence to show 
that behavioral inhibition tasks were not equivalent to other, more accepted tests of self-
control. Unfortunately, the present studies did not provide conclusive evidence to 
contribute to the Beran vs. MacLean debate as to whether or not performance on these 
tasks would correlate to performance on other, more widely accepted self-control tasks. 
Contrary to my predictions based off of MacLean et al. (2014), all but one subject 
performed well, including the individual who had failed to show self-control in the 
preliminary token exchange task. When attempting to assign ranks for the two behavioral 
inhibition tasks, there was not enough individual variation in performance, even when 
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considering all ten testing trials, to break the four-way tie for first place, precluding the 
analysis necessary to assess performance across tasks. Considering the degree of 
difference between the results from the present study compared to that of MacLean et al. 
(2014) one might be tempted to attribute the higher performance in this study to 
experience with self-control tasks. However, the disparity becomes even more surprising 
considering the MacLean et al. (2014) species scores included three individuals that had 
past experience on more traditional self-control tasks (e.g., Anderson et al. 2010), on 
which two successfully demonstrated self-control. However, MacLean et al. (2014) did 
not provide individual data, precluding further investigation as to how those specific 
individuals performed on the tasks, nor was their familiarity, or lack thereof, with 
transparent objects addressed. Furthermore, their study included individuals from two 
different populations of squirrel monkeys and the authors noted that the average scores of 
the populations did not differ significantly, which was unusual since the present study 
which was essentially a third population performed significantly better. These facts, 
coupled with minimal explicit data regarding the squirrel monkeys previous experience 
with cognitive tasks, made it difficult to hypothesize what could be responsible for the 
disparity in scores between the two populations tested in MacLean et al. (2014) and the 
one tested here. 
The present data do support the arguments made in Kabadayi et al. (2018) and 
van Horik et al. (2018) in that many cognitive and noncognitive factors can affect 
performance on behavioral inhibition tasks in general, and more specifically, the cylinder 
task. For this reason alone, it would be wise for researchers to avoid these tasks when 
 37 
investigating anything other than behavioral inhibition or behavioral flexibility, despite 
their convenience and adaptability. Additionally, one could argue that the A-not-B task is 
further confounded by a memory component in that the subject must remember where 
they last saw the reward. While subjects must only remember that information for a 
matter of seconds, it should still be considered when assessing the validity of the task, as 
memory capabilities vary between species. I also believe this task was intentionally 
misleading, in that the familiarization trials essentially train the subjects to look for food 
in that particular cup and they had never received food from any other cup previously. It 
is possible that looking for the reward in the familiar cup results from a habituated 
foraging strategy or risk avoidance rather than true behavioral inhibition. From this 
perspective, the task resembles a reversal-learning task more so than one of self-control. 
It would be interesting to see how the lower performing species would perform on this 
task if the containers were transparent, which would control for the issue of memory and 
habituation. One would assume that they would just go for the visible reward, but if they 
do not, it would clearly indicate a fatal flaw in the task. Transparency would not be an 
issue here, as it was in the cylinder task, because the familiarization trials with the 
transparent cups should provide the subject with enough experience with transparent 
objects. A test of this nature could help address the validity of the task and might provide 
parameters as to when it should be used, if it should be used at all. Future studies could 
also investigate the validity of these tasks by determining if the specific brain regions 
implicated in behavioral inhibition tasks are also activated in more accepted self-control 
tasks. Kabadayi et al. (2016) suggested that specific brain regions and neuronal 
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densities/populations are responsible for successful performance in these tasks, rather 
than absolute brain volume (as suggested by MacLean et al. 2014).  
 
Results - Food Exchange Task 
All subjects performed at criterion on the training phase in just one session. 
Criterion was successfully exchanging at least nine of ten high-value tokens for the high-
value food after a 5 s delay. As a reminder, this training phase is comparable to the first 
set of familiarization sessions in Draiper et al. (2005) and Ramseyer et al. (2006).  
All subjects also performed at criterion in the first testing phase (exchanging the 
low-value food for the high-value food with no delay) within three to ten sessions (M = 
7.6 sessions, SD = 2.8, Table 6), with criterion being the successful exchange of at least 
nine of ten low-value food pieces two sessions in a row. Individuals’ percent exchanges 
for these no delay sessions ranged from 10 – 86.67 % (M = 58.99%, SD = 31.08, Table 
6), and all subjects moved on to the next phase incorporating 2 s delays. Ranks, from 1 – 
5, were assigned for this phase separately, to allow for a direct comparison to the 
previously conducted token exchange task (Table 7). The following analyses include only 
the 6 delay trials per session (the 6 no delay trials per session were omitted from analysis, 
as they only functioned to keep participants engaged and performance was nearly 100%). 
As a reminder, the criterion for advancement here (borrowed from Ramseyer et al., 
2006), was exchanging in at least five of the six trials of a single session, or exchanging 
in at least three trials over the 18 trials (6 trials per session, over three sessions) of a given 
time delay. At the 2 s delay, four of the five subjects had a perfect performance (100% 
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exchange) in a single session and immediately progressed from the 2 s delay to the 5 s 
delay. The fifth subject met criterion, exchanging in 5 of the 6 exchange trials, after only 
two sessions with a 75% exchange rate (group: M = 95%, SD = 11.18). All subjects met 
criterion in the 5 s delay phase within one to three sessions, ranging from 66.67 – 83.33% 
exchange (N = 5, M = 69.44, SD = 18.42). Performance in the 7 s delay phases decreased 
slightly, although all subjects met criterion within two to three sessions. Two met the 5 
out of 6 criterion and three met the 3 out of 18 criterion, with percent exchange ranging 
from 16.67 – 75% (N = 5, M = 49.44, SD = 24.09). In the 10 s phase, one subject failed to 
move on to the next delay (15 s), exchanging only twice over the 18 trials. Of the 
remaining four subjects, two met the 5 out of 6 criterion and two met the 3 out of 18 
criterion, allowing them to be tested at the 15 s time delay. Percent exchange ranged from 
11.11 – 83.33% (10 s phase, N = 5, M = 44.44, SD = 30.17). Only one of the four 
individuals that were tested at the 15 s delay length met the minimum criterion to move 
on to the next delay length (20 s), exchanging in 3 of the 18 trials (16.67%). Another 
individual exchanged only twice (11.11%) and the other two subjects did not exchange at 
all (15 s phase, group analysis, N = 4, M = 6.95, SD = 8.33). Overall, this is a significant 
decrease in performance from the 10 s phase, Z = -2.023, N = 5, p = .043. The one 
individual that progressed to the 20 s delay length exchanged twice (11.11%), failing to 
meet the 3 out of 18 criterion necessary to test at a delay length of 25 s. Therefore, the 
overall delay that was tolerated by the squirrel monkeys ranged from 10 – 20 s (Table 6). 
Four of the five monkeys performed above chance on the control sessions, with three 
individuals never exchanging the high-value food for the low-value food, and one 
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individual exchanging only twice (p < 0.001, binomial test, needed to have 6 or fewer 
exchanges out of 24 to be significant), the fifth performed at chance on the control test 
exchanging the high-value food with the experimenter 17 times (p = .585, binomial test, 
needed to have nine or fewer exchanges out of 30 to be statistically significant), however, 
it should be mentioned that she was cycling at the time and displaying atypical behavior 
such as refusing to participate in the trials and discarding any value food she was given 
during the testing time for three days in a row, including the food she had exchanged for. 
Given the occurrence of this rare behavior, I suspect that her performance on the controls 
was a fluke and I did not remove any of her data from the food exchange analyses. 
Animals were ranked 1-5, with one being the highest, based on who was exchanging 
most often at the longest time delay (Table 7).  
 
Discussion - Food Exchange Task 
I predicted that the individuals who excelled in the previously conducted token 
exchange (bartering) paradigm would also excel in the food exchange task, because they 
had already demonstrated self-control under a similar situation, therefore the results from 
that experiment were considered alongside those of the present studies. Anecdotally, 
some subjects who obtained the low-value food during bartering trials, attempted to 
barter with the low-value reward (i.e., they tried to place the low-value food into my hand 
by thrusting their arm through the caging while holding the low-value food), providing 
further reason to suspect that they would be successful in the food exchange task.  
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The present experiment was the first to show that squirrel monkeys were capable 
of exchanging less preferred food with an experimenter to receive a more preferred food. 
As seen in Table 7, the ranks assigned for the initial testing phase (No Delay) did not 
match the ranks assigned for overall performance on the task (including delay trials of 
various lengths). Ranks were, however, identical to those from the token exchange task, 
which had a minimal (no) delay period. The result was slightly surprising, as the food 
exchange task was presumably more difficult because the participant must actively 
inhibit themselves from eating an immediately available food reward in their possession 
as opposed to choosing an immediately available food reward that was not yet in their 
grasp. Yet, we see that performance was comparable in trials of equal length delays – in 
this case no delay. I am curious to see if this pattern would hold across differing delay 
lengths, however, a token exchange experiment incorporating delays has not yet been 
conducted in squirrel monkeys. Further evidence from the present study actually suggests 
that the food exchange task was less difficult than the token exchange task, contradicting 
previous studies (Addesi & Rossi, 2011; Boysen, Mukobi, & Berntson, 1999; Mischel & 
Moore, 1973) because one subject (Arlene) exchanged tokens only minimally (in 2 of 50 
trials) but exchanged her low-value food for the high-value food in 36 of 90 no delay 
trials and continued exchanging as delay length increased to 15 s. I hypothesize that this 
may be due to the prevalence of the high-value reward at the time of the decision to either 
maintain self-control or to defect. In other words, in the token exchange task, the subject 
only sees the low-value food and the high-value token, as the high-value food was 
located behind the experimenter while the monkey made her choice. Conversely, in the 
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food exchange task, the high-value reward was held in front of the subject for the entirety 
of the delay length, perhaps increasing the motivation to maintain self-control. An 
alternate explanation for increased performance in the food exchange task compared to 
the token exchange task was that the food exchange task removed some of the cognitive 
demands on the participant. The participant would not have to remember the association 
between the high-value token and the high-value food at the time of the decision. A third 
explanation was that when faced with a choice between a consumable item and an 
unconsumable item, the response of reaching toward an available piece of food was more 
salient. The present study did not provide enough evidence to support one of these 
hypotheses over the other, however, I plan to conduct a follow up experiment to 
determine if Arlene’s performance on the token exchange task will be higher after her 
success on the food exchange task. If her performance does indeed increase, it might 
suggest that a cognitive factor initially hindered her performance and has now been 
learned. No change in performance would not provide us with any new information as to 
why there was increased performance on the food exchange task compared to the token 
exchange task.  
As mentioned earlier, performance on the token exchange task did not predict 
performance as to how long of a delay an individual would tolerate before defecting and 
consuming the low-value reward. This was best exemplified by Violet’s versus Echo’s 
performance. Violet was ranked number one in both the token exchange and the no delay 
food exchange phase, reaching criterion in just 3 sessions. However, her performance 
sharply decreased, from 66.67% to 0%, between the 10 s and 15 s delay lengths in the 
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food exchange task, which might suggest that she simply decided it was no longer 
advantageous to her to maintain the delay. Echo took longer to reach criterion in the no 
delay food exchange phase, meeting criterion in seven sessions, however, Echo’s rate of 
performance declined more gradually, with some exchanges still occurring at the 20 s 
delay. I suspect that this could be explained by a difference in ability versus motivation. 
For example, the ability to learn that maintaining a delay was “more” profitable was most 
likely separate from a participants’ propensity or willingness to actually tolerate that 
delay. Another factor that could have been at play here, is that the value of the reward 
varied subjectively for each individual participant. As the time delay increased, the value 
of the reward decreased at differing rates for each individual, a concept that has been 
addressed in multiple publications (e.g., Hayden, 2016) and in Beran’s (2018) current 
operational definition of self-control. It was unlikely that this was a result of more 
experience (i.e., additional trials for Echo) because those trials did not incorporate a delay 
and therefore could not have contributed to any shaping of a longer delay maintenance.  
Violet was not the only subject whose performance sharply decreased from the 10 
s to 15 s delay length, in fact, all subjects performances significantly decreased. It was 
possible that a more gradual increase in delay length would have protected against this 
drop in performance, however, I was concerned that continuing to increase delays by 
such small increments would shape the subjects’ performance. In other words, one could 
have made the argument that subjects were being trained to delay even though the 
intention was to measure their inherent self-control abilities.  
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Results indicated that squirrel monkeys have self-control levels that were 
comparable to some capuchin groups (Table 1). For example, the capuchin population in 
Ramseyer et al. (2006) maintained self-control for a range of 10 – 20 s when they were 
not allowed to nibble the reward before exchanging. Considering that these capuchins 
had much more experience with delayed food exchanges throughout the experiments 
conducted in Ramseyer et al. (2006) and were also participants in a previous food 
exchange task (Drapier et al., 2005), it was quite impressive that naïve squirrel monkeys 
performed just as well as capuchins did, especially with evidence from Beran, Perdue, et 
al. (2016) that indicates experience on a particular self-control task leads to increased 
performance on that task in the future. In fact, this effect could be seen when comparing 
the studies denoted by a superscript “a” in Table 1, indicating that the same population of 
capuchins were used in each study, with obvious increases in performance from one 
study to the next. Additionally, some of those individuals would not delay their 
gratification for more than 10 s, meaning that two of the squirrel monkeys in the present 
study (Arlene and Echo) actually performed better than some capuchins, despite having 
less experience. I suspect that if the squirrel monkeys were given more experience, their 
performance would be equal to that of capuchins. As discussed earlier, apes and Old 
World monkeys had much longer delay times than squirrel monkeys and capuchins 
(Table 1), but at the very least, the results of the current study indicate that squirrel 
monkeys are valid subjects for tests of self-control and should not be discounted based on 
their apparent “distractibility” and “short attention spans” (Fragaszy, 1985). It would be 
interesting to test whether squirrel monkeys perform successfully on this task if the 
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rewards differed quantitatively by exchanging a small piece for a large piece, as in 
chimpanzees (Beran et al., 2016; Dufour et al., 2007), macaques (Pelé et al., 2010; Pelé et 
al., 2011), and capuchins (Drapier et al., 2005; Ramseyer et al., 2006; Pelé et al., 2011). 
 
Results - Accumulation Task 
All subjects were given phases one and two, however, after phase two, one 
subject (Debi) was dropped from the experiment because she was having dexterity issues 
that precluded her from removing the reward from the store zone even though she was 
trying to do so. For this reason, her performance was not included in the analyses for this 
task.  
In phase one, where subjects were given 16 trials without any demonstrations, 
none were successful in accumulating any food pieces other than the one that marked the 
start of the trial. For subsequent phases, the percentage of food pieces accumulated out of 
the total number of pieces available without counting the initial piece to start the trial was 
calculated for each phase broken down by each time delay length (1, 3, and 5 s). Ranks 
were assigned for each delay length and they did not differ markedly, nor were there any 
interesting anomalies worth noting. Therefore, I collapsed the data across time delay 
lengths. The percentage of food items accumulated, meaning the number of food items 
accumulated out of the total possible food items that could have been accumulated (5 
pieces, since the first marked the start of the trial and was not included in analysis) were 
reported for each phase. Performance in phase two, where two demonstration trials were 
included in each session, was extremely low, with subjects accumulating only 0.33 – 7% 
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of the available rewards (Table 8), despite the inclusion of the demonstration trials in 
which the cart was pulled away from the caging to allow all possible food items to 
accumulate without the subject ending the trial early. Demonstration trials served to show 
the subjects what would happen if they did not interfere with the accumulation of food, 
and were not included in analyses for any phase. In general, subjects that succeed in 
accumulating some food items in this phase did not begin doing so until session seven, 
indicating that it took multiple sessions for them to learn the task contingencies. 
Phase three was noteworthy because the rewards differed by value with the first 
five pieces were low value and the sixth and final piece was of high value. Performance 
immediately increased during this phase for all subjects, Z = -2.03, N = 5, p < .05 (Table 
8). In fact, three of the five subjects met criterion, which was three trials in a row with 
perfect performance, which allowed them to progress to phase four rather quickly. Violet 
and Gwen had accumulation percentages of 100% and 97.78%, respectively, over their 
first three sessions, Echo had 96% over her first seven sessions and Arlene and Cora 
completed all ten sessions with 77.33% and 85.67%, respectively.  
At the start of phase four, which was essentially a replication of phase two with 
demonstration trials and all high-valued rewards, individual performances decreased for 
all subjects, with percentages ranging from 0 – 71.33%. The result was a significant 
decrease in the group’s performance from phase three to phase four, Z = -2.02, N = 5, p < 
.05. However, individual performances increased from phase two to phase four, for all 
but one individual, Violet, who accumulated two items in phase two, and no items in 
phase four. This change in performance trended toward significance, Z = -1.75, N = 5, p = 
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.08, and if the sample size was larger it may have reached statistical significance. The 
increase in performance indicated that either the additional experience or alternative 
reward contingency, or perhaps both, improved their ability to demonstrate self-control in 
the accumulation task (Table 8).  
For this reason, each subject was assigned two separate ranks for the 
accumulation task, one for overall performance and one for performance on phase three 
alone, this was to determine if varying the reward differences qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively affected performance on this task. As seen in Table 7, this difference 
played a substantial role in performance as every subject’s rank was reassigned, the most 
surprising being that the highest ranked individual became the lowest ranked, and vise-
versa. 
Due to Violet’ s lack of delaying gratification at all during all 10 sessions (60 
trials) of phase four, I did not test her in phase five. Phase five consisted of two sessions, 
each with two trials, where subjects could accumulate up to 10 pieces of high-valued 
food, with a delay of 3 s between each delivery. The test was conducted to make a direct 
comparison with Evans & Beran (2007b). Again, Arlene stood out, as she was the only 
subject whose performance increased from phase four to five, 71.33 to 86.11%, where all 
others decreased at least some amount (Table 8). 
 
Discussion - Accumulation Task 
Based on Anderson et al.’s (2010) results, I suspected that the squirrel monkeys 
would be capable of succeeding in the accumulation task, to some extent. Meaning that at 
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least some of the participants should progress to the final phase of testing. The data 
allowed for the direct comparison across Old World and New World monkey species as 
well as apes, and could lend itself to the discussion of how and why self-control abilities 
evolved. Furthermore, the within-subject design allowed me to speculate what each 
paradigm was testing, if the paradigms were testing similar aspects of self-control, and 
how we might expect other species’ performance to vary across tasks. For example, Pelé 
et al.'s (2011) results suggested that squirrel monkeys might be able to tolerate longer 
delays during the accumulation task than in the food exchange task. 
In phase one, the squirrel monkeys did not spontaneously delay gratification long 
enough to accumulate any reward pieces. While the result answers a question raised by 
Anderson et al. (2010), and allows for comparison between Evans & Beran (2007b), it 
could simply be that there was not enough information for the squirrel monkeys to learn 
the “rules of the game,” and their self-control abilities should not be diminished for not 
understanding the task at hand. The inclusion of demonstration trials (phase two) and 
reward variances (phase three) allowed them to conceptualize the rules of the task, which 
was shown through increased performances in phases four and five.  However, it was 
unclear if the demonstration trials would have been enough on their own to have led to 
the marked increase between phases two and four with more sessions, or if seeing the 
reward disparity in a different context (phase three) afforded them the opportunity to 
conceptualize the rules of the game in a manner that could later be generalized to the 
previous condition. In other words, the present experiment cannot determine if continuing 
phase two test sessions for additional experience would have eventually led to the level of 
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performance seen in phase four, or if having experience with low- and high-value 
rewards was critical in their understanding of the task. The marked increase in 
performance from phase two to phase four in the current study, was not displayed by 
rhesus macaques (Evans & Beran, 2007b). Perhaps the macaques had already fully 
learned the task, and the differing phase contingencies only revealed differences in 
motivation to delay gratification, whereas in the present study results likely indicated that 
learning took place during phase three. There was no means to determine if the learning 
occurred because of, or in conjunction with, the motivation increase.  
The change in performance from phase two (all high-valued food) to phase three 
(five low-valued foods followed by one high-value) parallels that of rhesus macaques in 
experiment one, phase two of Evans & Beran (2007b). It also corroborates previous 
findings that suggest animals are more likely to delay gratification when rewards differ 
qualitatively (low/high value) rather than when they differ quantitatively (small/large: 
Beran, Perdue, et al.,2016; Ramseyer et al., 2006; Hillemann et al., 2014). Future work 
should endeavor to uncover the reason for this pattern, as it was possible that the 
qualitative difference was more salient, or simply more desirable, which increased 
motivation to delay. For example, if a child was given the chance to delay gratification by 
forgoing accumulating crackers for a cupcake, I would suspect higher performance than 
if he/she were given the chance to accumulate multiple cupcakes. More importantly, it 
showed that the type of reward disparity was a critical factor in predicting a subject’s 
performance across tasks of self-control. When comparing the rankings assigned in phase 
three of the accumulation task to that of the token and food exchange tasks with no delay 
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(Table 7), both of which also addressed qualitative differences in rewards, there was an 
almost perfect consistency of ranks across the tasks.  
Overall, squirrel monkeys performed quite well on the accumulation task, 
surpassing the squirrel monkeys and even the capuchins of Anderson et al. (2010) with 
more subjects delaying gratification regularly. It was possible that squirrel monkey 
performance in this study was better due to the qualitative reward difference used in 
phase three, because Anderson et al. (2010) only differed rewards quantitatively. It was 
also revealed that the majority of training biases provided by Anderson et al. (2010) were 
necessary for the present population of squirrel monkeys to delay gratification on the 
accumulation task. Performance in the present study was comparable to some capuchin 
populations (Addessi et al., 2013; Evans et al., 2012) but fell short of others (Pelé et al., 
2011; Beran, Perdue, et al. 2016), which was impressive considering that they, again, had 
less experience than the subjects of these studies. Perhaps even more surprising, Arlene’s 
performance in phase five was comparable to rhesus macaques (Evans & Beran, 2007b), 
although it did not compare to the performance of other Old World monkey species that 
successfully maintained delays of over a minute (long-tailed macaques, Pelé et al., 2010; 
tonkean macaques, Pelé et al., 2011; chimpanzees, Beran et al., 2016; Dufour et al., 2007; 
see Table 1). 
 
General Discussion 
While the debate over the differing definitions of self-control is one of a 
philosophical nature that cannot necessarily be answered through empirical experiments, 
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the present studies have shed some light on what these paradigms are testing and how 
they should be interpreted. As discussed earlier, behavioral inhibition tasks should be 
treated with caution, as it is likely that they are not accurate measures of self-control, 
supporting the assertions in Beran’s (2015) opinion article.  
The squirrel monkeys in the present study clearly could maintain delays much 
longer (1.5 to 3 times as long) in phase three of the accumulation task than in the food 
exchange task which was similar to the capuchins in Pelé et al. (2011), who waited 2 to 4 
times longer. These results suggest that the tasks are not of comparable natures and 
should not be thought of as interchangeable. However, it should be noted that macaques 
performed similarly on both (Pelé et al., 2011) and future studies should investigate 
possible reasons for this difference in performance. I suspect that two factors were 
contributing to the difference in tolerated delay lengths, either separately, or in 
conjunction. The first was that it was more challenging to have to physically hold on to 
the low-value food rather than just inhibiting the impulsive reaction to reach for it. The 
second was that being able to watch the rewards accumulate had some effect on the 
subject’s motivation to delay gratification, perhaps being able to watch each piece be 
transferred helped to bridge the delay. A future study could address this possibility with a 
modification to the accumulation procedure used here and create a task that more closely 
resembles food exchange. The experimenter could start the trial off with a piece of the 
low value reward in the drop zone with the high value reward in the store zone for 
durations equal to those used in the food exchange task. If performance resembled that of 
the accumulation (longer delays tolerated), it would suggest that it was more challenging 
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for a subject to have to physically hold the food. If performance resembled that of the 
food exchange task, it would support the hypothesis that seeing the food accumulate 
played a role in their performance. A third, but unlikely reason, was that the subjects 
were sensitive to the total amount of food they received. However, as discussed, 
individuals tended to delay longer for qualitatively different rewards as opposed to 
quantitatively different, so this scenario should not be an exception. If the accumulation 
task was considered in full, not just phase three, as discussed immediately above, the 
results supported my prediction that the accumulation would be inherently harder than 
food exchange in the current studies due to the nature of the difference of their rewards, 
which was discussed in the accumulation section. 
I believe that both of these tasks, accumulation and food exchange, are valid tests 
of self-control although their results are not directly comparable to each other, especially 
if the qualitative/quantitative nature of the rewards differ. However, future studies could 
help determine whether we see these differences between task performance because the 
tasks elicit different levels of motivation, in addition to addressing which of these should 
be utilized by experimenters moving forward. 
It was thought that the nature of the test, whether it be delay choice or delay 
maintenance, measured fundamentally different aspects of self-control, with one 
measuring an animal’s propensity to initially delay gratification and the other measuring 
their ability to maintain that choice once it was made. Addessi et al. (2013) supported this 
hypothesis, showing only weak evidence for task equivalency between an intertemporal 
choice task (delay choice) and an accumulation task (delay maintenance). However, the 
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results of the current studies do not support that hypothesis. In fact, at first there did not 
appear to be any correlation within a subject’s performance across tasks overall, 
especially in relation to delay maintenance tasks (denoted by “DM” in Table 7) and delay 
choice tasks (“DC”). But, when I started to separate phases in consideration of other 
factors, patterns started to emerge. What appeared was that the qualitative/quantitative 
nature of the rewards played an important role in predicting the subjects’ performance on 
the tasks, at least when the delay was quite short (Table 7). As delay length was increased 
(as seen in the food exchange, overall column) the nature of the reward was no longer a 
predictive factor. Future studies could address how performance on hybrid delay tasks, 
briefly mentioned in the introduction of this paper, might compare to performance on 
delay maintenance and delay choice tasks, keeping in mind the importance of the nature 
(quantity/quality) of the choice. 
Anecdotally, results support those of Beran, Perdue, et al. (2016) in that 
experience on one specific self-control task did not necessarily improve performance on 
subsequent self-control tasks of varying types. The highest ranked monkey in each task 
(Table 7) was one of the subjects that started the experiment with that task as opposed to 
the other. More specifically, Arlene, Gwen, and Violet started with the accumulation task 
and moved on to the food exchange task after they had completed every phase of the 
accumulation task. As Table 7 shows, Arlene performed the best on the accumulation 
task overall, and Violet performed best on phase three (which was notable due to its 
qualitative nature, as discussed above). Echo and Cora started with the food exchange 
task before receiving the accumulation task and Echo received the highest overall rank 
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for the food exchange task. Violet was the only subject to improve her rank from her 
original task (overall accumulation) to her second task (food exchange “No Delay” and 
“Overall”) but based on her performance on phase three of the accumulation task, I 
believe this improvement occurred due to the change from quantitative reward 
differences to those of qualitative differences. She tended to perform extremely well 
when she was working to optimize a grape reward over a carrot, but only performed 
minimally, if at all, when she was working to optimize the number of grape pieces she 
received. Her performance in the accumulation task showed that she was capable of 
delaying gratification, and therefore understood the reward contingencies. The result begs 
the question of how she made the decision of when it was “worth it” for her to delay and 
when it was not, as witnessed in the sharp changes in her performance in phases two 
through four of the accumulation task, going from basically 0% to 100% and back to 0%.  
Finally, the present studies added to the existing literature pool of self-control 
studies, specifically addressing the paucity of data for New World monkey species in a 
way that allowed for the results to be directly compared to previous studies. The results 
of the present study support that the presence of marked individual differences in self-
control abilities is ubiquitous throughout the literature pool in both humans and animals. 
Unsurprisingly, apes perform better than Old World monkeys, who in turn perform better 
than New World monkeys. However, it is worth mentioning again how well the squirrel 
monkeys in the present study performed despite their lack of experience in self-control 
tasks, making them promising subjects for future studies of self-control. Furthermore, the 
presence of self-control abilities in apes, Old World monkeys, and New World monkeys 
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suggests that the capacity evolved before the divergence of ancestral New World 
monkeys 40 million years ago (Goodman, 1999). 
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Table 1. 
Summary of previous food exchange tasks 
Species Variable(s) Considered 
Range of Delay 
Tolerated Reference 
Chimpanzees Quantitative exchanges   
(rewards 2, 4, 8, 40x size). 
Delay length. 
15 s - 8 min Dufour et al., 2007 
Chimpanzees Reward type, size, and 
location. Delay length. 
most subjects 
tolerated the max. 
5 min delay 
Beran et al., 2016 
Long-tailed 
macaques 
Quantitative exchanges  
(rewards 2, 4, 8, 40x size). 
Delay length. 
10 s – 21 min, 20 s  Pelé et al., 2010 
Tonkean 
macaques 
Quantitative exchanges   
(rewards 2, 4, 8, 40x size). 
Delay length. 
 20 s - 2 min 40 s  Pelé et al., 2011 
Brown 
capuchinsa 
Qualitative/quantitative 
exchanges. Multiple 
exchanges in a row.  
most subjects 
tolerated 5 s delayb 
Drapier et al., 2005 
Brown 
capuchinsa 
Qualitative/quantitative 
exchanges. Multiple 
exchanges in a row. Delay 
length. 
10 - 20 s  
 
640 sb  
Ramseyer et al., 
2006 
Brown 
capuchinsa 
Quantitative exchanges   
(rewards 2, 4, 8, 40x size). 
Delay length. 
10 - 80 s  Pelé et al., 2011 
Brown 
capuchins 
Gradually increased delay 
times (1 s increments) 
6 - at least 35 s Fisher, 2014 
Squirrel 
monkeys 
Gradually increased delay 
times (2, 3, or 5 s 
increments) 
10 -2 0 s  Present Study 
Note. a = same population of subjects used in experiments. b = partial consumption of 
low-value food before exchange allowed. 
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Table 2. 
Summary of previous accumulation tasks 
Species Variable(s) Considered 
Range of Delay 
Tolerated Reference 
Chimpanzees 
and an 
orangutan 
Delay length (3, 6, 9 s). 
Orientation of 
experimenter to the subject 
(facing, turning back, 
walking away from). 
Qualitative Rewards. 
All subjects maxed 
out the delay period 
(3 min) 
Beran, 2002 
Chimpanzees Presence of a distractor 
(toy) 
3 s - 18 min (max 
delay) 
Evans & Beran, 
2007a 
Chimpanzees Reward visibility. 
Experimenter visibility. 
0 s - 2.5 min (max 
delay) 
Beran & Evans, 
2006 
Chimpanzees Whether they had to 
"work" for the reward or 
not 
50 s - 7 min, 43 s 
(max delay) 
Beran & Evans, 
2009 
Chimpanzees Food or tokens 
accumulating 
6 s - 2 min (max 
delay) 
Evans et al., 2012 
Chimpanzees Identity of social partner All subjects maxed 
out the delay period 
Parrish et al., 
2013 
Bonobos "Reliability" of 
experimenter 
2 of 4 subjects 
maxed out the delay 
period (50 s) 
Stevens et al., 
2011 
Orangutans Delay length. Reward 
visibility.  
10 s - 1 min 30 s 
(some maxed out 
the delays in phase 
one) 
Parrish et al., 
2014 
Rhesus 
macaques 
Effect of quantity, quality, 
and number of items  
3 s - 30 s (max 
delay) 
Evans & Beran 
2007b 
Long-tailed 
macaques 
 30 s - 2 min 11 s  Pelé et al., 2010 
Tonkean 
macaques 
Reward size. Delay length. 38 - 72 s Pelé et al., 2011 
Brown 
capuchins 
Reward size. Delay length. 33 - 42 s Pelé et al., 2011 
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Brown 
capuchins 
Food or tokens 
accumulating. Number of 
items available 
2 - 28 s Evans et al., 2012 
Brown 
capuchins 
Food or tokens 
accumulating. Number of 
items available 
2 - 28 s Adddessi et al., 
2013 
Brown 
capuchins 
Number of items were 
transferred at a time 
0 - 1 min 30 s (max 
delay) 
Beran, Perdue, et 
al., 2016 
Brown 
capuchins 
Delay length. 30 s (max delay) Anderson et al., 
2010 
Squirrel 
Monkeys  
Delay length. 30 s (max delay) Anderson et al., 
2010 
Squirrel 
Monkeys  
Qualitative/Quantitative 
reward effects. Delay 
length. 
30 s (max delay) Present Study 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
Subjects’ high- and low-value food pairings and past experience with self-control tasks 
Subject Low-value food High-value food 
Successful in token 
exchange paradigm? 
Arlene Corn Kernel Mealworm No 
Cora Carrot Mealworm Yes 
Echo Carrot Grape Yes 
Gwen Cheerio Mealworm Yes 
Debi Cheerio Grape N/A 
Violet Carrot Grape Yes 
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Table 4. 
Performance on first test trial of the behavioral inhibition paradigms 
Subject A-not-B Cylinder Composite Score 
Arlene C C 100 
Cora C C 100 
Debi* C I 50 
Echo C C 100 
Gwen C C 100 
Violet C I 50 
Average Score for Species 
(Present), First test trial only 
100 66.66 83.33 
Average Scores for Species 
(MacLean et al., 2014) 
15.8 33.37 24.7 
Note. Composite scores were calculated by averaging the "scores" from the A-not-B and 
Cylinder tasks (100 is awarded for correct and 0 for incorrect performance). C = Correct. 
I = Incorrect. * = subject who took considerably longer to reach criterion in the 
familiarization trials on the cylinder task. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  
Performance on all ten test trials of the behavioral inhibition paradigms 
Subject  A-not-B Cylinder Composite Score 
Arlene 100 100 100 
Cora 100 100 100 
Debi* 90 20 55 
Echo 90 100 95 
Gwen 100 100 100 
Violet 100 90 95 
Average Scores for Species 
(Present), All Test Trials 
96.67 85.00 90.83 
Note. Composite scores were calculated by averaging the "scores" from the A-not-B and 
Cylinder tasks (100 is awarded for correct and 0 for incorrect performance). * = subject 
who took considerably longer to reach criterion in the familiarization trials on the 
cylinder task. 
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Table 6.  
Summary of food exchange task 
 
 Training 
Phase 
No 
Delay 
% 
Return 2 s Delay 
% 
Return 5 s Delay 
% 
Return 7 s Delay 
% 
Return 
Subject # correct Sessions 
to crit. 
 # of ex. 
(max 6) 
 # of ex. (max 6)  # of ex. (max 6)  
Arlene 10 9 10.00 6  100 3 6  75.00 4 5  75.00 
Cora* 9 10 47.00 6  100 5   83.33 0 0 3 16.67 
Echo* 10 7 75.75 4 5 75 4 3 5 66.67 2 2 6 55.56 
Gwen 10 9 75.55 6  100 4 6  83.33 2 2 2 33.33 
Violet 10 3 86.67 6  100 1 2 4 38.89 4 4 4 66.67 
Mean  7.6 58.99   95    69.44    49.44 
SD  2.8 31.08   11.18    18.42    24.09 
Note. Criterion for moving on to the next time delay was exchanging in at least 5 out of 6 trials in a single session or 
exchanging in at least 3 trials out of the 18 possible trials for each time delay. Controls are out of 12 unless otherwise 
specified. * = subject was tested on this task before being tested on the accumulation task. # of ex. (max 6) = Number of 
exchanges made in each 6-trial session, with each session represented by one column. 
 
Table 6 Continued.  
 
10 s Delay 
% 
Return 15 s Delay 
% 
Return 20 s Delay 
% 
Return Controls 
Subject # of ex. (max 6)  # of ex. (max 6)  # of ex. (max 6)  S 1 S 2  (redo) 
Arlene 3 3 1 38.89 0 1 1 11.11     1 1  
Cora* 2 2 0 22.22 0 0 0 0     0 0  
Echo* 5   83.33 1 2 0 16.67 0 1 1 11.11 0 0  
Gwen 1 1 0 11.11         3 5 (of 6) 9 
Violet 3 5  66.67 0 0 0 0     0 0  
Mean    44.44    6.95        
SD    30.17    8.33        
 69 
Table 7.  
Summary of ranks across tasks 
Task Token Exchange Food Exchange Accumulation 
Subcategory No Delay No Delay Overall Phase 3 Overall 
Task Type DC DM DM DM DM 
Reward 
Disparity 
Quality Quality Quality Quality Mostly 
Quantity 
Arlene 5 5 2 5 1 
Cora 4 4 4 4 3 
Echo 2 2 1 3 2 
Gwen 3 3 5 2 4 
Violet 1 1 3 1 5 
Note. DC = Delay Choice. DM = Delay Maintenance. 
 
 
 
Table 8.  
Summary of accumulation results: total percentage of rewards accumulated per phase 
Subject Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 
Arlene* 3.67 77.33 71.33 86.11 
Cora 3 85.67 42.33 30.56 
Echo 7 96.19 44.33 41.67 
Gwen* 0.33 97.78 20.67 13.89 
Violet * 0.67 100 0 n/a 
Note. * = subject was tested on this task before being tested on the food exchange task. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A-not-B apparatus with cups on their side (A). For familiarization trials a 
reward was placed under an outermost cup and then all cups were flipped up (B). Refer to 
Video 1 for a demonstration of the test trial. 
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Figure 2. Cylinder task apparatus. The opaque cylinder used in familiarization trials (A) 
and the transparent cylinder used in test trials (B). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Experimenter demonstrating a correct response (A) and an incorrect response 
(B). 
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Figure 4. Diagram of accumulation apparatus. Gray rectangle denotes the top of the 
rolling tray. “Drop zone” is within the participants reach, the “store zone” is not.  
 
Video 1. Demonstration of a test trial for the A-not-B task. 
